Writing in Foreign Affairs ("Why Drones Work"), Daniel
Byman makes what might be the Obama administration’s own case for the use
of drones to kill people in aid of prosecuting the U.S. war of terror
overseas. It even echoes the President in its ostensibly
even-handed tone, affecting anguish over the difficulty of the decision but not
letting moral qualms stand in the way of endorsing the President’s weapon of
choice in a war in which the abductions and torture memos which characterised
the Bush years have given way to kill lists and murderous missile campaigns.
However, like the Obama administration,
Byman declines to ask the serious questions which should form the starting
point for any investigation into whether or how the United States should use
drones. In essence, Byman argues that
drones are cheap, efficient, and that their use is unavoidable given the
benefits they yield to the U.S. national security apparatus. His title, “Why Drones Work”, provides the theme
as well as the method for an article in which he disingenuously caricatures
opposition to drones and dismisses them without either examining the substance
of their criticisms or explaining the premise of his own argument.
In the entire paper, Byman doesn’t even
bother to pause and elaborate upon what ought to be the departing point for any
discussion of the use of drones: what do these weapons actually “work” at
doing?
That so elementary a question could go
unanswered let alone unasked perhaps tells us all we need to know about the
self-perpetuating nature of the national security commentariat, whose own
momentum—as opposed to the public interest—unchecked by any consultation of
those two savants Cause and Effect, not slowed in the slightest by any coherent
investigation of motive or interest, and unhampered by the exercise of any grey
cells, drives national security policy in the United States.
Clearly, drones are good at killing
individuals or small groups of people.
But technology is ultimately only as moral or as useful as the purpose
which inspires it and the production process—from its conception to its
application—which animates its deployment.
In the case of drones, thanks to commentators like Byman, the technology
is being separated from its policy goals and from the relationship between
those goals and any sense of morality. It
is striking that the author has exactly nothing to say about the character of
the world terroristic drone war is actually meant to aid the United States in
creating.
There is something almost ungrammatical
about Byman’s invocation of drones. His
thoughts are always left uncompleted.
Drones are “a necessary instrument of counterterrorism...”, but to what
end counterterrorism is necessary, we are not told. “They work”, he repeats, but does not say at
what.
Byman is willing to criticise aspects of
the drone programme, urging the administration “to improve its drone policy,
spelling out clearer rules for extrajudicial and extraterritorial
killings”. That is, he believes that we
need to perfect the process for killing outside the legal system which exists
to protect people against such abuse.
Byman pretends that most drone critics
believe the only alternative is capturing “militants”. But the questions that most critics ask probe
deeper than this. What we’re asking is
that people like Byman spend a few moments processing why it is that there are
militants in the first place. Why do we
feel that it is necessary to take recourse to methods of war which make many of
us queasy? Is it in fact necessary? What motivates “terrorists” and “militants”,
and are there actions that we could take—compatible with our values—which would
defang people’s anger with the United States?
Byman boasts that the extrajudicial and
extraterritorial use of drones within other nations is often supported by the
governments of those nations. But isn’t
this part of the problem? That these
governments, so eager to convince the sanguinary suckers in our national
security establishment that their domestic opponents are “terrorists”, use U.S.
military power to interfere in contests about democracy, accountability, and religion
in their countries. That despite the
conceit that we know what we’re doing and hold all the cards, we too readily
fall into the role of proxy for some pretty nasty governments, who are
virtually indistinguishable from the “terrorists” in their methods.
Byman complains that the critics are
unrealistic when they suggest “slashing unemployment in Yemen, bringing
democracy to Saudi Arabia, and building a functioning government in Somalia”. He might be correct to say that the United
States cannot wave a magic wand and bring these goals to pass. But what we could do is stop aiding and
abetting those forces and interests which work actively against these
ends.
Byman also notes the controversy around
the use of “signature strikes, which target not specific individuals but
instead groups engaged in suspicious activities”. Like the NSA’s unregulated data mining, signature
strikes are an illustration of the hubris of our security state, which makes
the outrageous claim that it doesn’t have to provide serious evidence, prove
guilt, or pay more than lip service to the values in the name of which it
claims to wage its vicious, hidden war.
Byman’s response to these concerns is to
take up the question of whether the strikes cause less “collateral damage” (i.e.
murder fewer innocent people) than other methods of killing. But he persistently refuses to acknowledge
the more nagging question...of whether we could act in a manner that prevented
us from having to kill people.
In his statistical ramblings, Byman does
not ask serious questions or seek to establish that the drone killings don’t
cause problems for the United States, but merely sows doubts about the accuracy
of the number of people we murder, and the degree of hatred our terroristic
methods generate. His inappropriately
chipper view seems to be, People hate us...but not as much as we might
think! We kill a lot of innocent
people...but not as many as we might! We
can murder U.S. citizens...but only some of them! This pitiless Pollyanna believes that clarity
about our immorality will save us from what he appears to regard as the
greatest danger: that “mistakes risk tarnishing the entire drone program”.
Indeed, it would be terribly unfortunate
if the reputation of the drone programme was called into question. Less worrisome to Byman, apparently, is the
danger that terrorism becomes the norm, a legally accepted, established, and
inscribed practise conducted by democratic governments in the name of the
people they represent. Or that the United
States is taking lives in an increasingly casual manner which not only
diminishes the value of human beings outside our borders, but does so in a way
that is calculated to spread violence and conflict across our world.
Byman might see himself as dealing with
a technical matter rather than addressing questions of right and wrong, and the
article demonstrates a clear disinterest in the use to which drones are being
put. But when a person advocates for the
utility of tools of war and violence and devastation, they cannot somehow
decide to recues themselves from the consequences of their advocacy.
Because ultimately, whatever fantasy the
Obama administration wants to indulge about drone wars not being real wars, to believe that drones can
work, you also have to believe that war can work. And we are faced with a litany of historical
misadventures, too many of them from our own lifetimes—resulting in butchery,
savagery, and destruction—which demonstrate time and again the futility of
making anything other than a victor’s pyrrhic peace by means of war.